Ubiquity and efficiency of restrictions on informal punishment rights by Eriksson, Kimmo et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Eriksson, Kimmo and Strimling, Pontus and Ehn, Micael  (2013) Ubiquity and efficiency of restrictions










Ubiquity and efficiency of restrictions on informal punishment rights 
KIMMO ERIKSSON1,2,, PONTUS STRIMLING1,MICAEL EHN1 
1Centre for Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Sweden 
2School of Education, Culture and Communication, Mälardalen University, Västerås, Sweden 
Abstract 
Over-punishment often occurs in anonymous peer-to-peer punishment in public goods game experiments 
where punishment is free for all. We report a public goods game experiment in which a condition where 
punishment rights were restricted to one other player per player yielded higher total welfare than a condition 
with unrestricted punishment. In the restricted punishment condition, there was much less punishment but 
high levels of cooperation were achieved nonetheless. This indicates that it may be beneficial to groups to 
restrict punishment rights. In a second study we presented respondents from many different countries with 
three scenarios constituting everyday social dilemmas of various kinds. Across countries, respondents 
tended to judge it as inappropriate for most involved parties to punish selfish individuals in the scenarios. 
Typically, only one party was judged to have the right to punish. Whereas much prior work has considered 
punishment as a public good that needs to be encouraged, these findings suggest that informal norms about 
sanctions tend to constrain punishment to certain individuals. Such norms may serve the function to harness 
the positive effects of punishment while containing the negative effects, and we suggest that they are likely 
to arise from learning.   
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The topic of punishments is controversial. Whereas some researchers promote peer-to-peer 
punishment as key to human cooperation (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002), others argue that this is actually an 
unsuccessful strategy (e.g., Dreber et al., 2009). These positions reflect that punishment has both an upside 
and a downside. The upside is potential deterrence of unwanted behavior. The downside is more 
multifaceted. Various psychological mechanisms may make threats of punishment ineffective as a deterrent 
(Netter, 2005). There are also costs of various kinds, in addition to the cost inflicted on the punishee: there is 
the punisher's effort, the punishment's potential damage to future relations, and costs that arise because 
punishment is sometimes used in ways that are not conducive to cooperation. Accordingly, several 
laboratory studies show that the net effect of punishment is not necessarily positive (e.g., Herrmann et al. 
2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008). Here we are interested in how social norms may 
deal with this problem by restricting punishment so that its potential as a force for increased welfare is 
harnessed. 
First note that a related but complementary solution is to formally place sanctioning powers in the 
hands of a central agency, e.g., a law-enforcing police (Baldassarri & Grossman, 2011). As famously 
observed by Max Weber, a central agency that adopts the responsibility to punish certain behaviors by 
coercion typically claims Gewaltmonopol, i.e., prohibits peer-to-peer coercion. A single central agency 
could, at least in theory, set punishment at a level that optimizes welfare. There is some experimental 
evidence that groups are better off when punishment is delivered by a central agency than when group 
PHPEHUVVDQFWLRQHDFKRWKHU2¶*RUPDQHWDO 
Here we are not concerned with central agencies but instead turn our attention to those situations 
where decentralized sanctions, often called informal sanctions, are actually used. Such situations occur when 
anarchy makes informal sanctions necessary (Amster 2003), but, more importantly, non-violent informal 
sanctions are often used when the offense is not on the level recognized by the central agency. Even in these 
situations, we claim that individuals are not free to punish each other at will, because strong social norms 
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regulate who can informally sanction whom. Our second study below is an international survey designed to 
demonstrate this claim.  
A complementary way of restricting punishment is to impose limits on the severity of punishment. 
Such norms have been identified as one of the key features of durable informal institutions for management 
of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990). In brief, restrictions of the severity of punishment are well-
known and have been the subject of influential research. Our focus here is instead on norms about who has 
no right to sanction another. Specifically, we propose that in a given situation with many potential punishers 
it may be illegitimate for most individuals to actually punish. Further, this illegitimacy is not inherent to the 
individual but based on context-specific roles. Research conducted in France has shown that both potential 
punishers and potential punishees perceive differences in roles as extremely important for who can 
legitimately sanction deviant behavior (Nugier et al., 2007; Chaurand & Brauer, 2008). Remarkably, this 
important notion that most agents may be normatively discouraged to punish selfish behavior seems to have 
been completely neglected in the large body of research on cooperation in social dilemmas. 
This neglect of norms against punishment may have its roots in the dominance of a game theoretic 
perspective on social dilemmas. Game theory assumes that agents are rational. In a social dilemma, the 
individually rational strategy is to defect. This problem can potentially be solved by a threat of sanctions 
against defection ± but if it is somehow costly to sanction others, a second-order free-rider problem arises 
where the individually rational strategy is to shirk from sanctioning. Thus, in order to uphold norms against 
defection, it is necessary to also uphold norms against shirking from sanction of defectors. Such norms to 
HQFRXUDJHSXQLVKPHQWZHUHFDOOHG³PHWDQRUPV´E\$[HOURGDQHDUO\SURSRQHQWRIWKHJDPH
theoretic approach.  
However, experiments on behavior in games have repeatedly demonstrated that the rationality 
assumption of game theory is not always valid. In particular, people do not seem to use punishment as game 
theory would predict. For instance, it has been demonstrated again and again that many people do use costly 
punishment even when they are not sanctioned for not doing so (e.g., Yamagishi, 1986; Fehr & Gächter, 
2002; Herrmann et al., 2008; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008).  It has also been shown that if a second stage 
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of punishment is available, it is more often used against those who punished than against those who did not 
punish in the first stage (Cinyabuguma, Page & Putterman, 2006). It is not difficult to find emotional 
XQGHUSLQQLQJVRIWKHVHLQVWDQFHVRI³LUUDWLRQDO´EHKDYLRU,QUHDOOLIHSHRSOHJHWDQJU\DWHDFKRWKHUDQGPD\
act on that anger whether it is rational or not (Lerner & Tiedens 2006). Specifically, people may get angry at 
someone they think behaved selfishly, and they may derive satisfaction from punishment of this individual 
(de Quervain et al., 2003; Singer et al. 2006). Because punishers tend to be seen as not WDNLQJRWKHUV¶
interests into account (Strimling & Eriksson, forthcoming), they may draw punishment from others who get 
angry at them. From an evolutionary viewpoint, there is of course nothing mysterious about anger 
sometimes producing irrational behavior. It is sufficient that anger has been adaptive on average. Even if 
XVLQJFRVWO\SXQLVKPHQWLQFHUWDLQODEH[SHULPHQWVLVQRWWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDGYDQWDJHLWHDV\WRFRQFHLYHRI
many situations in which it is beneficial for the individual to have a capacity for costly aggressive protection 
of his interests. What we are interested in here are the problems for the group that a propensity to punish 
others creates and the social norms that therefore should restrict people from using punishment. 
In the beginning we mentioned the multifaceted downside of punishment. In this paper we shall focus 
on the aspect of over-punishment. As discussed above, experiments show that many individuals are willing 
to punish others in social dilemmas. When someone behaves in a way that many others are willing to punish, 
and punishment is free for all, the same act may be punished several times. This is likely to sum up to more 
punishment than is necessary for deterrence. Let us quickly sketch what a formalization of this argument 
could look like: Assume that many agents are conditional cooperators and altruistic punishers, i.e., they will 
initially make high contributions and they will punish those who make low contributions in proportion to 
how low they are. Assume that other agents are rational, so that they would match the higher contributions 
of others if and only if they otherwise expect to be punished more than they would gain from making a low 
contribution. If every agent has just a single potential punisher, a rational agent will match the expected 
higher contribution of the punisher if they receive punishment at least as great as the proportion b of a 
contribution that is lost to the contributor. In typical experiments, b equals one half and punishment is just a 
third as costly to the punisher as to the punishee, in which case a single potential punisher is sufficiently 
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deterrent if he can be expected to pay at least one unit to punish a low contributor for every six units the low 
contribution is lower than his own. Further, if deterrence of low contributions is thus achieved with a single 
punisher, then having more than one punisher per punishee would be unnecessary. Of course, deterrence is 
not achieved immediately ± agents would first need a learning period where they develop expectations of 
HDFKRWKHU¶VEHKDYLRU'XULQJWKDWOHDUQLQJSHULRGSXQLVKPHQWZRXOGVRPHWLPHVEHXVHG. When punishment 
is used, it is done at a higher total cost if there are more punishers per punishee. This extra cost can then be 
regarded as over-punishment.  
The model sketched above is designed only to capture the idea that if many people are voluntary 
punishers, free for all punishment may lead to more punishment than is necessary. The model of course 
ignores many real features of the problem. It is therefore very important to see whether experimental 
restrictions of free for all punishment will actually lead to increased welfare. One previous study supports 
this conclusion: O'Gorman et al. (2009) argued that avoiding over-punishment was one potential benefit of 
centralization of punishment and they demonstrated in a public goods experiment that a condition where 
punishment was restricted to a single punisher yielded higher mean profits than a condition where everyone 
could punish. Our argument above suggests that centralization to a single punisher is just one special case of 
restricting punishment rights and that the problem of over-punishment may be addressed also by non-
centralized restriction of punishment rights. Our first study below is an experimental approach to this issue.  
Specifically, this study is aimed at demonstrating that also non-centrally restricted peer-to-peer punishment 
yields higher welfare than unrestricted punishment.  
The second question is to what extent punishment rights are, in fact, restricted. As we mentioned in the 
EHJLQQLQJFHQWUDODXWKRULWLHVWHQGWRUHVWULFWLQGLYLGXDOV¶ULJKWWRSXQLVKHDFKRWKHUXVLQJYLROHQFH2XU
proposition is that even for the kind of punishment that is allowed between individuals, such as humiliating 
or yelling at the punishee, social norms informally restrict punishment rights to a considerable extent. As a 
consequence, situations regulated by central authorities and situations regulated by social norms among 
peers will not be so different after all. In particular, we propose that social norms restrict punishment rights 
in everyday social dilemmas. In other words, we propose that even in situations where several people suffer 
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IURPRQHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHOILVKEHKDYLRU, most of the involved parties tend to be discouraged from punishing 
the selfish individual. We investigate this proposition in an international web survey (Study 2). 
Above we discussed norms that limit over-punishment as beneficial to the group. We do not, however, 
suggest that such norms arise from some kind of group selection process. Indeed, selection can never explain 
why something arises, only why it spreads. For something as complex as social norms, the first priority must 
be to understand the process whereby they arise in the first place. Only then can it be evaluated whether 
subsequent selection is necessary to explain the popularity of a certain norm, or whether the initial process 
whereby norms arise might be sufficient to explain also the popularity of certain norms. Although an 
investigation into this is outside the scope of this paper, in the discussion we sketch a process whereby 
norms that restrict punishment can be expected to arise through individual learning within a cultural context. 
We strongly encourage research on how norms in general, and norms about use of punishment in particular, 
arise. 
Study 1 
The objective of the first study was to demonstrate that, by avoiding over-punishment, even non-
centralized restrictions on punishment rights can increase the efficiency of cooperation is a social dilemma. 
Non-centralized restrictions can be structured in many different ways, and in real life we expect many 
different structures to appear depending on the context (see Study 2). In this experiment we simply chose a 
structure maximally different to a centralized structure. Centralization of punishment amounts to a single 
punisher who can punish everyone, with everyone else restricted from punishing at all, as in the study of 
2¶*RUPDQHWDO. To achieve maximal non-centralization, we used a structure where every group 
member was restricted to punish exactly one other player, namely, the next player along a cycle (Figure 1).i 
                                                 
i
 This cyclic punishment structure has been used in one previous study (Carpenter 2007). However, that study also restricted 
information on contributions such that every player was informed only of the contribution of his or her designated punishee. In 
contrast, we are here interested specifically in the effect of restricting punishment rights, holding other things constant. 
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Our prediction is that mean profits will be higher if punishment is restricted in this non-centralized way than 
if punishment is unrestricted.   
Participants  
One hundred and sixty participants (55% male, average age 24 years) were recruited from a pool of 
people who had previously registered as interested in taking part in game experiments. Participants were 
mainly students all across Stockholm University. Twenty sessions took place with 12 participants per 
session. The part of the session devoted to this experiment lasted approximately half an hour. Each monetary 
unit (MU) earned during the session equated to SEK 0.15. 
Design and procedure 
Participants were randomly divided into groups of size four. In order to model everyday situations 
where the same groups interact repeatedly (as in Study 2), groups were fixed throughout the session and 
group members could keep track of the other three group members through persistent identifiers (the 
numbers 1 through 3). Keeping these features constant, the experiment aimed at investigating the difference 
between restricted and unrestricted punishment rights, as detailed below. 
 In each round of the game, every participant received an endowment of 20 MUs and decided how 
much of this endowment to contribute to the common pot. Participants were informed that contributions to 
the common pot were doubled and distributed equally to all group members. Thus each MU invested in the 
common pot yielded a payoff of 0.5MU to each group member, irrespective of who invested, as in many 
other studies (e.g., O'Gorman et al., 2009). After contributions were made, every player was informed of 
each group member's contribution. See Appendix 1 for complete instructions. Groups played eight rounds in 
a no-punishment treatment followed by eight rounds in a punishment treatment. The punishment treatment 
existed in two different conditions, with 20 groups in each condition: 
(1) Unrestricted punishment: Every participant was asked for each of the other group members, after 
being informed of their respective contributions, how many MUs he or she wanted to use to reduce the 
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payoff of that group member. For each MU paid to punish someone, three MUs were deducted from the 
punishee's earnings.  
(2) Restricted punishment: Same as the previous condition except that participants could only punish 
their designated punishee. As depicted in Figure 1, punishees were assigned cyclically (and this assignment 
was fixed). 
The total profit of a group over a treatment was measured as the sum of all payoffs to group members 
over the eight rounds of the treatment, from which sum the total endowments (8 rounds × 4 group members 
× 20 MUs per round and group member = 640 MUs) were subtracted. In the no-punishment treatment, the 
total profit simply equaled the total contribution to the common pot, because every MU contributed to the 
pot created an extra MU of total payoff. In the punishment treatment, the total profit equaled the total 
contribution minus the total cost of punishment, which is 4 times the total number of MUs paid to punish 
others.   
Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of how total contributions, total punishment costs and total 
profits depended on treatment and condition. Figure 2 shows per round profit. As expected from random 
assignment of conditions, there was no significant difference between conditions in the no-punishment 
treatment, t38=0.75, p=0.46. In the punishment treatment, total profits were higher when punishment was 
restricted than when it was unrestricted, t38=2.42, p=0.02, d=0.72. This difference was driven by total 
punishment costs being lower when punishment was restricted, t38=3.39, p=0.002, d=0.95; there was no 
significant difference in total contributions, t38=0.53, p=.60. 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment clearly support the notion that non-centralized restriction of punishment 
rights can increase the efficiency of cooperation in a public goods game by reducing over-punishment. It 
should be noted that in the last few rounds of the experiment profits increased in the unrestricted punishment 
condition (see Figure 2), indicating that the problem of over-punishment diminished over time. One reason 
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behind this was a tendency for punishees to be punished by fewer punishers later in the game; the Spearman 
correlation between the average number of punishers of those who were punished at all and the round of the 
game was negative: rho(8)=-.69, p=.058. This can be interpreted as spontaneously developing role-taking, 
which is one way in which norms about who can and who cannot punish who could develop. We return to 
this topic in the general discussion. 
 
Study 2 
The objective of the second study was to demonstrate the ubiquity of informal restriction of 
punishment rights in everyday social dilemmas. We used three scenarios chosen to represent three basic 
types of social dilemmas: depletion of a common resource, free-riding on a joint effort, and pollution of a 
common environment. In each scenario, there were several parties in different roles who all suffered from 
VRPHRQH¶VVHOILVKEHKDYLRU2XUSUHGLFWLRQZDVWKDWPRVWSHRSOHQRQHWKHOHVVZRXOGILQGLWLQDSSURSULDWHIRr 
some of these parties to punish the selfish behavior, restricting punishment rights to only a single role in 
each scenario. 
Participants  
An online survey was completed by 528 participants (63% male; mean age 30 years) of mixed 
educational backgrounds and from 73 different countries. Participants were recruited using the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (https://www.mturk.com) and received a compensation of half a US dollar.  
Design and procedure  
The questionnaire presented three scenarios (see Appendix 2). In brief, the scenarios described (a) two 
families dining together and discovering that one of the children has already eaten the sweets meant for 
dessert; (b) a hospital ward where one nurse has come in to work very late such that the others have been 
forced to work extra hard; (c) a student apartment where one of several roommate has made a mess in a 
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common area. Each scenario also specified parties that were harmed and could potentially sanction the 
selfish behavior: (a) the child's siblings, the child's parents, and the other parents; (b) the head nurse, and 
another nurse with a degree from a prestigious school; (c) a roommate, and a roommate's visitor.  
For each specified party respondents judged the appropriateness of that party punishing/reprimanding 
the selfish behavior. Similar judgments were made also of the alternative sanction of praising/rewarding the 
others who had not acted selfishly. Judgments were made on a five point scale (-2=highly inappropriate, -
1=somewhat inappropriate, 0=neither appropriate nor inappropriate, 1=somewhat appropriate, 2=highly 
appropriate). It was made clear that the appropriateness of sanctions should be judged in comparison to the 
party not reacting at all, so a response below zero means that the respondent thought the party in question 
should not sanction.   
Finally, respondents were asked for each scenario whether "situations more or less like this scenario 
(where your answer would be the same) are common," using a five-point response scale from -2=very 
uncommon to 2=very common.   
Results 
The majority of respondents thought that situations similar to those in the scenarios were quite 
common or very common (the two highest points on the five-point response scale): 66% in the making-a-
mess scenario, 64% in the coming-late scenario, and 66% in the eating-the-sweets scenario. An ANOVA for 
each scenario revealed no significant differences between countries. We conclude that these everyday social 
dilemmas were recognized across cultures as commonly occurring. 
Table 2 summarizes judgments of appropriateness of the fourteen possible combinations of parties and 
sanctions.  The overall result is that most combinations are judged as inappropriate. In other words, most 
parties should not engage in sanctions. However, in every scenario there was one clear exception, i.e., one 
particular party for whom it was clearly appropriate to use one particular sanction. For instance, in the 
making-a-mess scenario it was inappropriate for the visitor, but appropriate for the roommate, to punish the 
messy roommate. Similarly, in the coming-late scenario it was inappropriate for another nurse with a degree 
from a prestigious school, but appropriate for the head nurse, to punish the late-coming nurse. Finally, in the 
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eating-the-sweets scenario three different levels arose: it was inappropriate for another parent, weakly 
appropriate for a sibling, but clearly appropriate for the child's parent, to punish the sweet-eating child. 
Interestingly, use of rewards was typically judged as inappropriate for all involved parties in all scenarios 
(with the exception of the head nurse for which it was weakly appropriate to use rewards).  
In summary, the general pattern of judgments across the three scenarios was that rewards were 
generally inappropriate and punishments were inappropriate unless delivered by a context-specific preferred 
party: the roommate, the head nurse, and the child's parent, respectively. To quantify this pattern, three 
domain indices were computed for each participant: reward by any party DYHUDJHMXGJPHQWRILWHPVĮ 
0.64; Mean ± SD = -0.27 ± 0.93); punishment by a non-preferred party DYHUDJHMXGJPHQWRILWHPVĮ 
0.57; Mean ± SD = -0.68 ± 0.91); punishment by a preferred party DYHUDJHMXGJPHQWRILWHPVĮ 
Mean ± SD = 1.18 ± 0.81). The item "punishment by the child's sibling" was excluded as this item lay 
somewhere between non-preferred and preferred. 
Our main interest lies in punishment by a non-preferred party. An ANOVA with country as a factor 
showed that the negative mean value (-0.68) was significantly different from zero, F(1,527)=105.2, 
p<0.0001, and the effect of country was small and insignificant, F(72,527)=1.3, p=0.06. Indeed, the country 
mean was positive just for seven (out of 73) countries and none of these seven countries were represented by 
more than three participants. 
As an additional post hoc analysis, we examined whether individual differences in attitudes to 
sanctions reflected the three index domains. A principal component analysis of the fourteen judgments was 
performed. The scree plot supported a three factor solution, explaining 52.5% of the variance. As can be 
seen in the factor loadings (Table 3), these three factors clearly corresponded to the index domains.ii With a 
factor loadings cutoff value of 0.35, thirteen items each uniquely loaded on the predicted factor. The 
remaining item was "punishment by the child's sibling", which, consistent with this item's unclear status 
between non-preferred and preferred, cross-loaded on both punishment-related factors. These results support 
                                                 
ii
 Factor intercorrelations were low (between .03 and .22). 
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the validity of the index domains and indicate that individuals' sensitivity to roles of punishers and use of 
rewards generalize beyond specific scenarios.   
Discussion 
This survey demonstrated that respondents across the world recognized our scenarios, which were 
chosen to represent everyday social dilemmas. Moreover, in all these everyday social dilemmas and across 
countries we found evidence of general agreement on informal restrictions of sanctioning rights. We 
conclude that social norms on use of informal sanctions tend to restrict punishment rights to individuals in 
certain roles, specific to the context. This is consistent with prior research on legitimacy of social control 
(Nugier et al., 2007; Chaurand & Brauer, 2008). Of course, our study used only three scenarios. While these 
three scenarios all yielded the same response patterns, it cannot be ruled out that other broad classes of 
scenarios exist where norms would be different. Thus, it is still an open question how generally restrictions 
of sanctioning rights apply. 
Our survey also indicated that the content of context-specific restrictions were similar between 
cultures, such that across different countries the same roles tended to be excluded as punishers. However, 
this study was limited to a highly selective convenience sample of the world's population (individuals who 
take part in online studies in English). The tendency of specific restrictions to be universal must be studied 
further.  
Finally, some readers may think it self-evident that it is inappropriate for some parties to punish in the 
scenarios we used. After all, if there are ingrained norms that not everyone has the right to punish, this is the 
expected reaction. It is all the more remarkable that the existence of such norms is not reflected in the 
current literature on punishment and cooperation. 
 
General Discussion 
In this paper we have made the following argument: Because of flaring emotions, many people are 
willing to punish others who behave in ways they dislike ± EXWLWLVQRWWRWKHJURXS¶VEHQHILWWKDW
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punishment is free for all. For one thing, it leads to costly over-punishment. It therefore makes sense for 
social norms to restrict punishment rights to selected individuals. This is a very different story from the 
literature that views punishment plainly as a public good that individual needs to be encouraged to 
contribute to (e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 2001). 
We presented two studies investigating different parts of the argument. First, a public goods 
experiment showed that a condition where each group member's punishment capability was restricted to just 
one designated punishee yielded higher profits than a condition where every group member could punish 
everyone else. This extends the scope of positive effects on profits from restrictions of who can punish who, 
which had previously been investigated for the special case of centralization to a single punisher (O'Gorman 
et al., 2009). While each study is not very strong evidence on its own, our study and the sWXG\RI2¶*RUPDQ
and colleagues together constitute more robust evidence that restrictions of who can punish who reduces 
over-punishment while still sustaining high levels of cooperation. The additional importance of our finding 
is that it demonstrates that centralization is not necessary for restriction of punishment rights to increase 
efficiency. Of course, very many different non-centralized punishment structures are possible. Although a 
more systematic experimental investigation of different structures would be desirable, we think the logic 
captured in the model presented in the introduction always apply.    
Note that our experiment did not manipulate the legitimacy of designated punishers; every participant 
was simply designated as a punisher of someone else. Research on legitimacy of authorities has shown that 
perceived legitimacy, in particular a shared sense of legitimacy, creates voluntary compliance with norms 
(Zelditch & Walker, 1984; Tyler, 1997). For experiments of the type considered here, this would suggest 
that efficiency could be even higher if, by some manipulation, punishers were to be perceived as more 
legitimate.iii 
                                                 
iii
 For instance, although centrally restricted punishment was shown to be successful at increasing contributions, both by 
O'Gorman et al. (2009) and Baldassarri & Grossman (2011), the cost of punishment was still so high that experimental treatments 
without punishment yielded higher profits. This could be because the abstract and anonymous experimental design does not give 
punishers in the laboratory the same legitimacy that designated punishers would typically have outside the laboratory. 
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Our second study was an international survey that presented three scenarios where someone behaved 
selfishly in everyday social dilemmas. Participants judged for various involved parties whether it would be 
appropriate or inappropriate for them to punish the selfish behavior. Across many different countries we 
found that it was judged as inappropriate for most parties to punish. In other words, we found strong 
evidence for social norms restricting sanctioning rights exclusively to individuals in certain roles.  
Our two studies together demonstrate that informal restrictions of punishment rights exist and that they 
can be beneficial to a group. However, as we mentioned in the introduction we do not think any kind of 
group selection is necessary to explain the origin or prevalence of these norms. Here we sketch a process 
that relies only on learning. The core of our argument is that individuals will try to avoid having to suffer 
obvious downsides of the use punishment. First, even if the intended consequence of punishing someone is 
to deter selfish behavior for the benefit of the group, the actual consequences may be poor both for the 
punisher (who may be subject to anger and retaliation) and for the group (which may suffer from poorer 
group morale, whereas the selfish behavior may not be deterred at all). Second, the consequences are likely 
to be different depending on who punishes who in what situation. In any given situation where there is 
heterogeneity in roles and relationships ± including power, authority, trust and responsibility in relation to a 
potential punishee ± some potential punishers are more likely to use punishment successfully (i.e., to achieve 
high compliance and avoid negative effects). Further, the abovementioned kinds of consequences of 
punishment are easily observable. Individuals may therefore note patterns of successes and failures in use of 
punishment and form intuitions about who should and should not use punishment in various situations. 
These intuitions may then feed back into the roles and relationships in terms of further adding to the 
legitimacy of some roles as punishers and further reducing the legitimacy of others. Because perceived 
legitimacy in itself is a determinant of compliance, this will reinforce the differences between those roles 
that tend to be more successful, and therefore preferred, as punishers, and the others who tend to be less 
successful, and therefore non-preferred, as punishers.   
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Of course, the selection of a preferred punisher and the rejection of non-preferred punishers rely on 
some heterogeneity in roles to begin with.iv In lab experiments on punishment in social dilemmas, 
heterogeneity is typically absent by design (participants are anonymous and games are perfectly symmetric). 
We predict that ideas about who can be sanctioned by whom would develop if heterogeneity were to be 
LQWURGXFHGIRULQVWDQFHE\ODEHOLQJSOD\HUVDV³3DUHQW$´³&KLOG$´³3DUHQW%´DQG³&KLOG%´DQGOHWWLQJ
participants interact within parent-child dyads before and after the social dilemma part of the experiment. 
This is for future research to test.  
It should be noted that norms that restrict punishment to a context-dependent legitimate punisher may 
address several of the problems with the efficiency of punishment. For instance, the problem with counter-
punishment (Nikiforakis, 2008) is potentially mitigated by norms that proscribe the use of counter-
punishment against a legitimate punisher while allowing counter-punishment against an illegitimate 
punisher, such that a parent may counter-punish someone who punished her child. Similarly, the problem 
with antisocial punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008) is potentially mitigated by norms that strip antisocial 
punishers of their legitimacy. Both these possibilities are interesting areas for future investigations into 
norms restricting punishment.     
Finally, note that our survey shed new light on the use of positive sanctions like rewards and praise. 
Some experimental research has shown that rewards may work better than negative sanctions as a solution to 
the welfare problem in public goods games (Rand et al., 2009). The results of our survey suggest that this 
solution to social dilemmas may have limited scope outside the laboratory, because it was generally 
considered inappropriate to react to selfish behavior by rewarding people who were not selfish. We did not 
expect this finding; our theoretical argument deals with punishment only and rewards were included in the 
survey for the purpose of completeness of sanctioning options. According to a recent meta-analysis, rewards 
and punishments can both be effective to raise cooperation (Balliet, Mulder & Van Lange, 2011). We have 
                                                 
iv
 In real situations where there is no heterogeneity, surveys indicate that it is largely perceived as inappropriate for any individual 
to punish, whereas collectively organized punishment is judged appropriate (Strimling & Eriksson, forthcoming). 
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no ready explanation of the finding of inappropriateness of rewards. Why and when it is considered 
inappropriate to use rewards are important questions for further research. 
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Appendix 1: Instructions to Study 1 
You are going to play a game, over several rounds, in a group of four participants. In each round, every 
participant receives 20 points. From these 20 points you will be able to choose how many points you want to 
put in a common pot. In the same way, every member of your group will choose how much to put into the 
pot. 
When all participants have decided their contribution to the common pot, the amount in the pot will 
automatically be doubled. The contents of the pot will then be divided equally to each participant, regardless 
of their previous contribution. This means that for each point you or anyone else contribute to the pot, you 
will receive 0.5 points back from the pot. (You will therefore make a net loss of half a point for each point 
you contribute.)  
This game was played for eight rounds. After each round participants were informed of others' 
contributions. (The others were labeled A through C along the cycle, see Figure 1) . The experiment then 
proceeded to the punishment treatment, where the previous instructions were repeated with the following 
addition (boldfaced part depending on whether the condition was restricted or unrestricted punishment): 
After each round you will be able to see how much everyone has contributed and you will then have a 
possibility of punishing one player/the other players. To punish others costs you points, but it costs the 
punished player even more. For each point you spend on punishing someone, that player loses three points. 
For example, if you spend five points on punishing someone, that player will lose fifteen points. You can 
spend up to ten points on punishing another player. 
This game was played for eight rounds. After each round participants were informed of others' 
contributions. In the restricted punishment condition, they were then asked how many points they wanted to 
spend on punishing "player A"; in the unrestricted punishment condition, they were asked the same question 
for each of players A through C. Finally, they were informed about any punishment they received (but they 
were not informed about how others were punished). 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire used in Study 2 
Below we present three scenarios where someone behaves selfishly with respect to a group. For each 
scenario we are interested in your opinion on: 
฀• who can legitimately act in reaction to this behavior, and 
฀• whether appropriate actions are to punish/reprimand the person who misbehaved or to reward/praise 
those who didn't misbehave (or both). 
Specifically, we will present some possible combinations of who reacts and whether the reaction is by 
punishing or rewarding. For each such reaction scenario we will ask your opinion on whether it is more or 
less appropriate than no reaction at all. The following response scale will be used: 
฀฀ 2: Highly appropriate compared to no reaction at all.   
฀฀ 1: Somewhat appropriate compared to no reaction at all. 
฀฀ 0: Neither appropiate nor inappropriate compared to no reaction at all. 
฀฀ -1: Somewhat inappropriate compared to no reaction at all.  
฀฀ -2:  Highly inappropriate compared to no reaction at all.   
 
At a gathering of two families, one of the children (say, Kevin) has eaten up the sweets that everyone 
in the two families were supposed to share after dinner. Both families are around when this is found 
out.  
a) How appropriate would it be if the other parents punish/reprimand Kevin in this situation? 
b) How appropriate would it be if Kevin's siblings punish/reprimand Kevin in this situation?  
c) How appropriate would it be if Kevin's parents punish/reprimand Kevin in this situation? 
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d) How appropriate would it be if Kevin's siblings reward/praise everyone but Kevin in this situation? 
e) How appropriate would it be if the other parents reward/praise everyone but Kevin in this situation? 
f) How appropriate would it be if Kevin's parents reward/praise everyone but Kevin in this situation?  
g) Would you say that situations more or less like this scenario (where your answer would be the same) are 
common? 
฀฀very uncommon ฀฀quite uncommon ฀฀neither common nor uncommon ฀฀quite common ฀฀very common 
 
At the hospital, one nurse (say, Rachel) did not show up until very late one day; in the meantime the 
others had to work extra hard. Both other nurses, of varying educational backgrounds, and the head 
nurse (Rachel's supervisor) are around when this is found out.   
a) How appropriate would it be if another nurse on the ward, with a degree from a more prestigious school 
than Rachel, punishes/reprimands Rachel in this situation? 
b) How appropriate would it be if the head nurse punishes/reprimands Rachel in this situation? 
c) How appropriate would it be if another nurse on the ward, with a degree from a more prestigious school 
than Rachel, rewards/praises everyone but Rachel in this situation? 
d) How appropriate would it be if the head nurse rewards/praises everyone but Rachel in this situation? 
e) Would you say that similar situations, where your answer would be the same, are common? 
฀฀very uncommon ฀฀quite uncommon ฀฀neither common nor uncommon ฀฀quite common ฀฀very common 
 
In a student apartment, one of the students who live there (say, Cath) has created a mess. Both a 
roommate to Cath and a visitor to the roommate are around when this is found out.   
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a) How appropriate would it if Cath's roommate's visitor punishes/reprimands Cath in this situation?  
b) How appropriate would it be if Cath's roommate punishes/reprimands Cath in this situation?  
c) How appropriate would it be if Cath's roommate's visitor rewards/praises everyone but Cath in this 
situation?  
d) How appropriate would it be if Cath's roommate rewards/praises everyone but Cath in this situation?  
e) Would you say that similar situations, where your answer would be the same, are common? 








Figure 2. Mean profit per round in each condition.  
 
